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Code, Nudge, or Notice?
Ryan Calo
ABSTRACT: Regulators are increasingly turning to means other than law
to influence citizen behavior. This Essay compares three methods that have
particularly captured the imagination of scholars and officials in recent
years. Much has been written about each method in isolation. This Essay
considers them together for the first time in order to generate a novel
normative insight about the nature of regulatory choice.
The first alternative method, known colloquially as architecture or “code,”
occurs when regulators change a physical or digital environment to make
undesirable conduct difficult. Speed bumps provide a classic example. The
second method, libertarian paternalism or “nudging,” refers to leveraging
human bias to guide us toward better policy outcomes. For instance, the state
might attempt to increase organ donation by moving to an opt-out system
because people disproportionally favor the status quo. Finally, mandated
disclosure or “notice” requires organizations to provide individuals with
information about their practices or products. Examples include everything
from product warnings to privacy policies.
These methods feel more distinct than they actually are. The timely example
of graphic warnings on cigarettes illustrates how hard it can be to
characterize a given intervention and why categories matter. The issue—
which was headed for the Supreme Court—turned on whether the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) intended for the warnings to change smoker
behavior or merely to provide information. The FDA abandoned the
intervention when it became clear the “warnings” were really about driving
down smoking. Indeed, whether regulators employ code, nudge, or notice,
they almost always have a deeper choice between helping citizens and
hindering them. This Essay argues that regulators should choose
“facilitation” over “friction” where possible, especially in the absence of the
usual safeguards that accompany law.
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INTRODUCTION
To code, nudge, or notice? That is the question today’s regulators
face—at least the growing number who would influence citizen or firm
behavior without passing new laws against conduct. Absent throughout
much of the twentieth century, alternatives to regulation in the classic sense,
i.e., coercing behavior by laying down rules and punishing transgressions,
are gaining widely in popularity.1
Three regulatory mechanisms in particular seem to have captured the
public, academic, and official imagination. The first is architecture or
“code,” which refers to altering the physical or digital world to make certain
conduct more difficult or costly.2 A speed bump provides the classic
illustration.3 The second is “libertarian paternalism” or “nudging”; its
mechanism is to exploit the ways that individuals deviate from rational
choice in order to benefit themselves or society at large—for instance, by
using our bias toward the status quo to encourage employees to put more of
their paychecks into savings.4 A third is mandated disclosure or “notice,”
which works by requiring the provision of facts with the hope that
consumers or citizens will use those facts to protect themselves and police
the market.5 Information privacy is mostly governed in this way.6 Each
alternative has its adherents;7 each, its critics.8

1. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998) (“Law
. . . directs behavior in certain ways; it threatens sanctions ex post if those orders are not
obeyed.” (footnote omitted)). I do not mean by this definition to endorse the so-called
command theory of law or suggest that law operates exclusively by identifying transgressions
and setting and enforcing penalties. Id. at 662 n.4; see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
16 (3d ed. 2012) (criticizing as insufficient John Austin’s theory of law as orders backed by
threats). I mean only that within many civil, criminal, and administrative contexts the
imposition of a rule serves as a natural starting point. The exact contours of law as such are
outside the scope of this Essay.
2. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Architecture As Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); Lessig, supra note 1, at
663 (referring to architecture or “nature”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation
of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998).
3. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 98; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles
Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 696 (2007).
4. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–6, 107–09 (2008); see also infra notes 69–70 and
accompanying text.
5. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 649–50 (2011).
6. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1031–32 (2012).
7. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4 (defending nudge); Calo, supra note 6
(defending notice); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655 (2006) (defending code).
8. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5 (criticizing notice at length); Julie
E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (criticizing the use
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Code, nudge, and notice represent perhaps the ascendant regulatory
alternatives of our time. They are much discussed in isolation. This Essay
represents possibly the first effort in any discipline to treat them all together.
My analysis suggests that, despite emerging out of very specific
conversations, code, nudge, and notice are not in the end terribly distinct.
They share mechanisms and problems to a greater degree than any existing
literature would suggest.9 Perhaps as a consequence, it is difficult to fit actual
emerging regulatory interventions squarely within code, nudge, or notice.
Consider New York City’s controversial attempt to limit the size of
sodas.10 A cap on portion size can be considered code in that it makes
drinking an excess of soda physically more difficult. But it is also a nudge, in
that consumers can override the policy by simply buying two sodas, and, like
notice, it warns against the danger of overconsumption. Speed bumps are
code, as I said. But what of “virtual” speed bumps, like an illusion of a little
girl chasing a ball in a parking lot? Like code, this actual intervention
eschews or supplements speed limits by making it harder to speed.11 The
intervention also exploits the way our brains see certain kinds of images as
having three dimensions when in fact they do not. This feels like nudging.
Or perhaps the virtual speed bump is a form of visceral notice to warn
motorists of the possibility that children are in the area.12
These questions of characterization really matter. The issue of whether
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) can require graphic visual
warnings on cigarettes seemed headed to the Supreme Court until the FDA
abandoned the intervention.13 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
considered these warnings to be mere “information,” a carve-out to the usual
scrutiny that attends coerced speech under the First Amendment.14 The
D.C. Circuit concluded instead that the visual images that the FDA would
have required—which included, for instance, a woman weeping
of architecture in the context of copyright); Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006) (criticizing libertarian paternalism).
9. See infra Part IV (discussing why code, nudge, and notice are not treated together).
10. Ellis Henican, NYC’s Big-Soda Ban Falls Flat―For Now, NEWSDAY (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://long-island.newsday.com/search/nyc-s-big-soda-ban-falls-flat-for-now-1.5824291. I owe
this helpful and timely example to the Iowa Law Review.
11. See Clay Dillow, Optical Speedbumps Create Illusion of Little Girl Darting Out in Front of You,
POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2010-09/opticalillusion-reminds-drivers-slow-down-change-pants.
12. See Calo, supra note 6, at 1033–47 (developing the concept of visceral notice).
13. See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
14. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556–61 (6th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, Am. Snuff Co., LLC v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). Coerced speech
refers to the government forcing a citizen or entity to endorse a particular message, for
instance, by pledging allegiance to the flag. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 633 (1943). This doctrine has not been held to encompass notice requirements aimed at
preventing consumer deception. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985).
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uncontrollably—were aimed at changing behavior and hence pressed the
cigarette industry into regulatory service.15 In other words, the warnings
were valid if they were notice, but invalid if they were code or nudge.16
The premise of this Essay is that there is a more fundamental choice
than whether to code, nudge, or notice: the choice between helping citizens
and hindering them. This Essay develops the original terms facilitation and
friction to help capture the distinction. Facilitation refers to helping citizens
develop and consummate their intentions. Friction refers to creating
barriers—physical or otherwise—to the conduct citizens would otherwise
carry out. One way to think about the criticisms of both code and nudge is
that each substitutes for the coercive function of law by introducing friction,
a sometimes milder, sometimes stronger form of coercion than law. Which is
fine. The problem is that regulators perform this substitution without
reintroducing the procedural safeguards that usually attend the passage,
interpretation, and enforcement of laws. Alternatives to law should arguably
prefer facilitation where possible if for no other reason than we expect less
of a justification for helping citizens than for hindering them.17
Mandated notice, meanwhile, is facilitation—but an ineffective form.
Aspects of code or nudge could help rehabilitate notice without
compromising its facilitative nature. Indeed, each technique can be used
alone or in combination to assist citizens in more justifiable ways. Thus,
instead of a speed bump (code), regulators can encourage safer driving
simply by calling the driver’s attention to their speed and contrasting it with
the limit in that area (code-backed notice). Regulators can use an awareness
of psychology to generate better forms of notice, as when regulators convey
the dangers of a particular stretch of road by reference to the number of
deaths that have occurred there.18 Or they can use code to better target
notice and provide citizens with a means of acting on their choices, for

15. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
16. Similar debates attend the procedures required in some states to secure an abortion or
to opt out of a vaccine. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding
abortion waiting period); Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (2004); Lessig, supra note
1, at 670 (discussing the use of architecture to regulate abortion).
17. The soda size cap was ultimately struck down. The court reasoned, in part, that the
Board of Health’s action violated separation of powers by usurping the role of the legislature in
identifying new health hazards. See N.Y. Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene., 970 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. July
30, 2013), leave to appeal granted, No. 2013-869, 2013 WL 5658229 (N.Y. Oct. 17, 2013).
Another way to characterize the issue, however, would be to say that the Board sought to avoid
the difficult political battle involved in designating soda as a health hazard through the use of
libertarian paternalism.
18. See Richel Albright, TDOT Signs to Update Road Deaths on Friday, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 4,
2013),
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20130104/NEWS01/301040092/TDOT-signsupdate-road-deaths-Fridays?gcheck=1. I owe this example to Mary Fan.
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example, by displaying a child abuse hotline number on a billboard that can
only be read from the visual angle of a child and not that of an adult.19
The dichotomy between friction and facilitation is far from a perfect
one. These values exist on a spectrum, and there are instances where—just
as with code, nudge, and notice—friction and facilitation blend together.
The basic mechanism of facilitation, i.e., picking and executing individual or
collective preferences, is itself plenty messy, as recent legal literature
explores.20 And there will always be a role for friction in ordering human
affairs. But exploring the possibilities for facilitation that code, nudge, and
notice each permit—especially as these strategies are blended and
recombined—may help alleviate the understandable backlash against the
popular use of behavioral control.
The argument proceeds as follows. The first three Parts present unique
typologies of code, nudge, and notice. I describe the contours of each
intervention by reference to its respective literature; I explain some of the
factors that make these particular interventions so popular; and I lay out
their most salient critiques. In Part IV, I question the apparent categories of
code, nudge, and notice in two ways. First, I show how several regulatory
interventions could be said to fit within any of the three categories,
depending on the analyst’s perspective. Second, I suggest that there is
ultimately little meaningful difference, or at least there is significant overlap,
between the respective strategies and critiques of code, nudge, and notice.
The Essay is up to this point descriptive. In Part V, I venture finally into
normative territory by offering facilitation over friction as the appropriate
lodestar for regulators seeking alternatives to legal prohibition, and offer
examples.
I.

CODE

A government can make conduct illegal or next to impossible.
Sometimes known by the labels “architecture,” “code,” “lex informatica,” or
“situational crime prevention,” governments and firms alter human
environments to channel behavior away from unwanted conduct.21 A city
can slow its traffic down by setting speed limits and pulling over violators or
by making speeding impractical by dotting its roads with speed bumps.
Content providers can appeal to copyright laws to protect against pirated

19. See David Kiefaber, Child-Abuse Ad Uses Lenticular Printing to Send Kids a Secret Message
That Adults Can’t See, ADWEEK (May 6, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/
child-abuse-ad-uses-lenticular-printing-send-kids-secret-message-adults-cant-see-149197.
20. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A
WORLD OF LIMITS (2011).
21. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2 (code); SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: FROM THEORY
INTO PRACTICE (Kevin Heal & Gloria Laycock eds., 1986) (“situational crime prevention”);
Katyal, supra note 2 (architecture); Lessig, supra note 1 (architecture); Reidenberg, supra note 2
(lex informatica).
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music, or they can wrap their content in digital rights management software
that makes copying it very hard.22
The realization that architecture can function as a kind of regulation is
not new, but regulators of the twentieth and twenty-first century appear to
be developing a taste for it.23 It did not always occur to regulators that
architecture was an option. In 1951, the City of New York faced a problem
with stolen wastebaskets. It seemed no amount of policing could keep the
phenomenon under control. When officials decided on the idea of using
architecture through the simple expedient of bolting trashcans to the
sidewalk, the decision made the front page of The New York Times.24 The
ascendance of this regulatory method in the intervening decades is well
chronicled.25 Scholars, too, have embraced architecture as an alternative to
law. Lawrence Lessig’s famous book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace
(“Code”) sounded a mostly cautionary note.26 But many others have urged
greater and greater reliance on architecture—often for good and interesting
reasons.27
Partly as a consequence of its popularity, architecture is a closely studied
regulatory phenomenon, its contours mapped by some of the academy’s
leading lights. Lessig and others have drawn a distinction between primary
and secondary interventions by architecture.28 A primary intervention alters
the environment to make conduct physically more difficult.29 A speed bump,
a suicide net, and digital rights management in copyright are all examples. A
secondary intervention alters the environment as well, not to prevent
conduct, but to make it harder to get away with.30
A traffic light camera does not prevent individuals from running the
light. It just makes it harder to run the light without getting a ticket. Lessig

22. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 4–7.
23. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 101–26
(2008).
24. Arthur Gelb, City Bolts Trash Baskets to Walks in Test to End Long Wave of Thefts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1951, at 1.
25. This is not to say that regulation by architecture was non-existent. A recent article in
Slate pointed out, for instance, that authorities poisoned grain alcohol during Prohibition, just
as they sprayed paraquat on marijuana crops many years later. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 257 n.39;
Deborah Blum, The Chemist’s War, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2010/02/the_chemists_war.html.
26. LESSIG, supra note 2.
27. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
28. See Gary T. Marx, The Engineering of Social Control: Intended and Unintended Consequences,
in THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 347, 351 (James M. Byrne &
Donald J. Rebovich eds., 2007); see also Cheng, supra note 7, at 664 (referring to “Type I” and
“Type II” structure).
29. Marx, supra note 28, at 351 (“We can identify primary direct prevention efforts . . . ,
which are designed to make the offense impossible, or very difficult to carry out.”).
30. See id.; Cheng, supra note 7, at 664 (referring to architectural approaches that “make
detection and prosecution easier to accomplish”).
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gives the example of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, a federal law that requires networks to change their architecture to
make it easier for law enforcement to isolate communications in connection
with investigations of federal crimes.31
Jonathan Zittrain has drawn a further distinction between preemptive
and post hoc interventions through primary architecture.32 Preemptive
architecture makes conduct more difficult to commit, as discussed. As for
post hoc interventions, our increased reliance on digital technology has
made it possible to erase illegality after the fact. Zittrain points to the
example of a cable company that sells a digital product such as a digital
video recorder, only to have another company claiming exclusive rights over
the technology sue for patent infringement.33 A court can order—and has
ordered at least once—that the defendant–company retroactively terminate
the service for all its customers.34 The years since Zittrain’s book have given
us the literary example of Amazon being forced to erase digital copies of
George Orwell’s 1984, of all books, from its popular e-reader due to a
licensing disagreement.35
Does secondary architecture admit of a dichotomy between preemptive
and post hoc interventions the way Zittrain maintains of primary
architecture? Not at first blush. Secondary architecture is about changing
the environment to make crimes harder to get away with. Presumably this
happens before the crime is committed, as when rental companies install GPS
devices so as to later recover stolen vehicles. Where the rental company
shuts down a stolen vehicle remotely through disabling technology, the
crime is stopped by post hoc primary architecture—without necessarily
making it easier to catch the perpetrator.
Yet in another sense, what is forensic science but a kind of post hoc
alteration of the environment in an effort to bring offenders to justice?
From magnifying glasses to DNA labs, advances in technology have
converted the many places crimes have been committed into crime scenes.
Advances in software or computer power can and do shed new light on old
facts. Such forensic interventions come after the crime—sometimes long
after, as when so-called “cold cases” are revisited in light of new technology.
Knowledge of these technologies could deter or change criminal behavior.
Hence, much of forensics could be viewed as a secondary post hoc
architectural intervention.

31. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 44–46 (citing Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified in 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1010 (2006))).
32. ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 108–09.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 104 (citing examples).
35. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html?_v=0.
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Officials and scholars want architectural regulation in the tool kit
because they perceive it to be more effective or, in some instances, more fair
than traditional enforcement mechanisms. Zittrain, a critic, acknowledges
the temptation to wave a magic wand that ends murder.36 Joel Reidenberg,
with whom Lessig shares credit for the insight that “code is law,” argues that
code makes a “useful extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve
objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws.”37 Neal Katyal, a wellknown opponent of anti-terrorism detention practices, argues in a pair of
articles that legislatures chronically undervalue crime enforcement through
architecture.38 Edward Cheng goes further to suggest that “[l]egislatures
cannot rule by fiat alone.”39 Elizabeth Joh has argued for greater
architectural regulation to reduce police discrimination when enforcing
traffic laws.40 The traffic light does not care about black or white, only red
and green.
In addition to efficacy and fairness, regulators are attracted to
architecture because it does not necessarily have to pass through a political
process. No law needs to be proposed, debated, voted upon, or passed to
make public stairs narrower so that teenagers do not hang on them (or to
add an annoying high-pitched sound to environments that only teenagers
can hear).41 And yet these changes have the practical effect of eliminating or
lowering the incidence of loitering. This “feature” of architecture is also the
source of one of its central critiques: a lack of process and transparency.42
Code can, but need not, be subject to the same procedural safeguards as law.
Moreover, whereas laws must be posted to be effective (or, in some views,
legitimate), code is often invisible to the uninitiated.
Perhaps the most powerful critique of architecture, however, has to do
with its effect on the possibilities for institutional and individual resistance.
At the level of structure, code threatens separation of powers.43 One branch
of government (say a city council) can decide to change the architecture of
a road, website, or other public space and simply hire a contractor to carry
out the decision. The contractor does not have “contractual discretion”
analogous to a prosecutor declining to bring a case or an officer looking the

36. ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 110 (“If one could wave a wand and make it impossible for
people to kill each other, there might seem little reason to hesitate.”).
37. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 556.
38. Katyal, supra note 2; Neal Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture As Crime Control, 112 YALE
L.J. 2261 (2003).
39. Cheng, supra note 7, at 715–16.
40. Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 199, 200–03 (2007).
41. Sarah Lyall, This Mosquito Makes Unruly Teenagers Buzz Off, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/world/europe/28iht-journal.html.
42. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 224–25.
43. Cf. id. at 7 (asking how separation of powers can operate in cyberspace).
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other way. Erosion is the only desuetude.44 In other words, the executive—
the local police department or attorney general—does not serve as a check
on the legislature. And if the change makes the offensive behavior
impossible or unlikely, if there is no law to interpret or apply, then the
judiciary has neither need nor opportunity to get involved.45
At the individual level, code decreases the possibility of civil
disobedience, a fact that Lessig and other students of code recognized
immediately.46 Even after a bill becomes a law, the law is not inviolate; it is
continuously tested. Sometimes a rule—for instance, no African Americans
may sit in the front of the bus—later strikes us as amoral, but only after some
brave person makes a symbol of herself by violating the law. Changing the
architecture of a system can change the possibilities for resistance. For
instance, one of the greatest advocates of civil disobedience—Henry David
Thoreau—argued that paying taxes constituted a form of acquiescence in
government policy; he was jailed for refusing to do so.47 Thoreau would have
to find alternatives today, given that the government withholds the bulk of
our taxes in advance from our paychecks.48
A related critique is the effect of code on various defenses available at
law—general defenses such as necessity and justification, or specific ones
such as fair use in copyright.49 Perhaps we want individuals or professionals
(like ambulance drivers) to ignore speed limits on the way to the hospital,
yet they cannot ignore speed bumps. Digital rights management makes it
impossible for users to practice rights to fair use,50 an exception to copyright
of arguably constitutional dimensions.

44. Desuetude is the doctrine that refuses to apply laws that have long fallen into disuse.
For a discussion, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 148–56 (1962).
45. In theory, any government activity is subject to challenge. Thus, individuals or groups
might challenge the act of changing the environment or code. Such challenges are rare in
practice.
46. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (1996)
(“In the well implemented system, there is no civil disobedience.”).
47. HENRY D. THOREAU, RESISTANCE TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1849), reprinted in THE
HIGHER LAW: THOREAU ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND REFORM 63, 79–80 (Wendell Glick ed.,
2004).
48. Cheng, supra note 7, at 675 (“Structure is the cornerstone of the American income tax
system . . . . [S]tructural mechanisms such as income withholding and information reporting
have dramatically reduced the opportunities for tax evasion.”); Lederman, supra note 3, at 697
(“Withholding taxes, like speed bumps, constrain compliance with the law.”).
49. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 49, 59–65 (2006); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 50–51 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The
Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 274–76 (2002).
50. See sources cited supra note 49.

E1_CALO (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

1/2/2014 12:30 AM

CODE, NUDGE, OR NOTICE?

783

Then there is the matter of too much enforcement. In an
underappreciated chapter of a celebrated book, Zittrain argues that if there
is an optimal level of enforcement, it is not one hundred percent.51 Sonia
Katyal and Eduardo Peñalver, too, explore in detail the perils of overenforcement, by code and otherwise, in the wider context of property.52 In
short, the varieties of intervention by code, and the likelihood that
regulators will look to code as a means to prohibit conduct or remedy harm,
have only increased in recent years. Code, meanwhile, is proving a
dangerous substitute to laws in ways we are still realizing.
II. NUDGE
Ten years after Code enshrined architecture as a plausible form of
regulation, the best-selling book Nudge put its own title concept front and
center.53 Libertarian paternalism, or “nudging,” refers to regulation not by
foreclosing behavior through changes to a physical or digital environment,
but by exploiting cognitive biases.54 The central insight of the behavioral
turn in economics is that humans deviate from rational decision-making in
anticipated ways.55
People are “predictably irrational” to borrow from another book title from
around the same time.56 In Nudge and elsewhere, legal scholar Cass Sunstein
and economist Richard Thaler propose that officials leverage these
irrationalities to nudge people toward beneficial behavior.57 The technique
is paternalistic in the sense that officials choose particular policy goals in
advance—they know best.58 But it is libertarian, Sunstein and Thaler argue,
because citizens are ultimately free to disregard the government’s nudge
and behave as they would.59
Like code, the nudge concept has influenced academics and
policymakers alike, many of whom appear to appreciate the “third way”

51.
52.

ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 110–23.
See generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010).
53. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4.
54. Id. at 4–6.
55. With roots in the 1950s work of Herbert Simon, behavioral economics famously
challenges traditional economic models that assume people will behave rationally. HERBERT A.
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 200 (1957).
56. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS xx (2008).
57. See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003); Richard H.
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV., May 2003, at 175.
58. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 5.
59. Id.
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between coercion and inaction that libertarian paternalism promises.60 More
and more policies are coming to the fore that in some way nudge citizens
toward more positive or productive behavior, and numerous essays and
articles propose deploying nudges in one context after another.61 Sunstein
was, until recently, on leave from the University of Chicago and working
within the presidential administration, where he reportedly championed
behavioral approaches to regulation.62 Thaler has served in a similar capacity
in the United Kingdom.63
Note that nudging, as described, is only one possible move of many that
behavioral economics could suggest. Writing with Christine Jolls, Sunstein
also posits a role for law in attempting to neutralize irrational tendencies, a
process the authors label “debiasing.”64 Debiasing is distinct from nudging in
that it posits removing bias instead of repurposing it.65 Jon Hanson and
Douglas Kysar call upon law to address the concept of “market
manipulation,” a term Hanson and Kysar develop to describe incentives for
firms to exploit consumer bias systematically in order to capture social
surplus.66 And, as discussed below in the context of notice, legal scholars
repeatedly invoke behavioral economics in order to criticize the mechanics
of various regulatory regimes governing a wide variety of contexts, including
privacy, predatory lending, securities, and many others.67 Scholars also
60. See Adam Burgess, ‘Nudging’ Healthy Lifestyles: The UK Experiments with the Behavioural
Alternative to Regulation and the Market, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 3, 6 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science of Change, TIME (Apr. 2,
2009), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1889153,00.html.
61. See, e.g., Sonny Eckhart, A Nudged Solution to Securities Fraud, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 81
(2012) (advocating for nudging to curb securities fraud); Jeffrey J. Minneti, Relational Integrity
Regulation: Nudging Consumers Toward Products Bearing Valid Environmental Marketing Claims, 40
ENVTL. L. 1327 (2010) (environmental regulation); Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging Savings
Under the Earned Income Tax Credit: A Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 83
(2010) (tax); see also Burgess, supra note 60, at 3–6 (describing how American and British
officials have come to embrace behavioral science in general, and nudging in particular); id. at
6 (“In the American context, nudge is a Democrat[ic] administration initiative.”).
62. Burgess, supra note 60, at 4 (noting that Sunstein was appointed “nudger in chief,”
i.e., the head of the Office of Regulatory Affairs).
63. Id.
64. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199
(2006).
65. This is sometimes described as the difference between “debiasing” and “rebiasing.”
E.g., Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 316, 317 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004).
66. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 637 (1999). Matthew Edwards has suggested that rebates
and other schemes that rely on cognitive bias should be regulated under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323,
353–59 (2008).
67. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 341, 342 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006)
(privacy); Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-
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propose variants of libertarian paternalism itself, such as asymmetric
paternalism, which aim to refine and improve the concept.68
The specific premise of Nudge is, again, that a familiarity with how
people deviate from rational decision-making will help regulators achieve
public policy goals without resorting to coercion.69 Sunstein and Thaler
propose several categories and examples. Perhaps the most famous is the use
of defaults. To encourage various behaviors—for instance, increasing the
overall amount of savings or encouraging organ donation—Sunstein and
Thaler suggest that the government set the default at the preferred activity
level.70 People have something of an irrational preference for the status quo,
so many will not resist the default. Those that really prefer not to save or
donate, however, can still opt out.71 Another example is feedback, i.e.,
providing people with a salient picture of their behavior in an effort to
encourage changes that are better for the person, the environment, or some
other goal.72
Nudging has its fans and its detractors. A recurrent theme in criticisms
of libertarian paternalism is that nudging is inherently manipulative.73 Read
your Huxley, the argument runs—at least you can see brute force coming.74

Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 242 (2005)
(lending); Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 476 (2007) (securities); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 160–61 (2006) (securities); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15 (securities); Lauren E. Willis,
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV.
707, 741 (2006) (lending).
68. E.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for “Assymetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2003).
69. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 5–6. The book Nudge contains a variety of
techniques, some of which appear less like rebiasing and more like debiasing or even the
straightforward provision of information. But the core insight of libertarian paternalism is that
regulators can make behavior more likely by leveraging known bias while preserving an element
of choice. Id.
70. Id. at 108–09 (savings); id. at 177–79 (organ donation).
71. Some states have adopted mild forms of implied consent to donate organs, which were
promptly challenged as unconstitutional. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing
Incentives to End America’s Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 125–26 (2004). Although
these statutes survived, stronger opt outs could run into the strong instinct toward autonomy in
American law. Id. at 126.
72. Together, the six suggested methods form the somewhat strained mnemonic of n-u-dg-e. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 100.
73. E.g., Luc Bovens, The Ethics of Nudge, in PREFERENCE CHANGE: APPROACHES FROM
PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY 207, 208 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson
eds., 2009); Burgess, supra note 60, at 10; Glaeser, supra note 8, at 155–56; Evan Selinger &
Kyle Whyte, Is There a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and Ethics of Choice Architecture, 5 SOC.
COMPASS 923, 928–35 (2011).
74. The reference is to ALDOUS HUXLEY, A BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946). Some also read this
implication into the work of Michel Foucault. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 8, at 21–29.
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Short of a brave new world, we might worry about governments developing
too much of a taste or skill for subtly influencing citizen choice.75 Sunstein
and Thaler anticipate this criticism and gesture toward the publicity
principle—a concept borrowed from John Rawls writing elsewhere—in
reply.76 The principle states that officials should never use a technique they
would be uncomfortable defending to the public; nudging is no exception.77
This response seems to miss the gravamen of the manipulation critique,
which sounds in deeper concerns over eroding autonomy. And, of course,
one official’s comfort zone could be many citizens’ dystopia. A second
version of the criticism holds that nudging citizens tends over time to
infantilize them.78 People who do not regularly confront choices cease to be
in the habit of making them.79
Perhaps the most trenchant criticism, however, is that libertarian
paternalism, no less than standard paternalism, relies on officials to generate
the goals toward which to nudge people.80 Officials are also flawed, so how
do we know officials are nudging citizens in the right direction? Several
commentators take this critique one cynical step further: if firms wanted a
particular outcome for (anti)competitive or other reasons, perhaps it would
be easier and cheaper to influence a handful of policymakers than it would
be to influence everyone else.81 Though an elegant idea, its proponents are
short on examples.82 But here is a recent one: rather than encourage
individual consumers one at a time to sign up to share their Netflix movie
rental history on Facebook, the companies successfully lobbied Congress last
year to change the Video Privacy Protection Act to allow for implied

75. Glaeser, supra note 8, at 155 (“Soft paternalism requires a government bureaucracy
that is skilled in manipulating beliefs. . . . There is great potential for abuse.”); cf. 22 U.S.C. §
1461 (2012) (limiting domestic propaganda).
76. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 244–45 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971)).
77. Id. at 245.
78. Bovens, supra note 73, at 215, 218.
79. See id. at 215.
80. E.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism,
2009 BYU L. REV. 905; Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and Libertarian Paternalism, 108
MICH. L. REV. 913, 918 (2010) (reviewing THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4) (“Yes, human
beings are sometimes prone to cognitive error, but what about the choice architects—the
experts?”).
81. E.g., Glaeser, supra note 8, at 145 (“The assumption that it is cheaper to sway a limited
number of governmental decisionmakers than it is to move the beliefs of millions is supported
by the much greater magnitude of spending on consumer advertising relative to political
spending.”).
82. But see James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for
Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779 (2012) (exploring the phenomenon
in the context of antitrust).
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consent.83 They found it more efficient to influence Congress than their
millions of users.
III. NOTICE
The most popular regulatory alternative to classic command-andcontrol regulation may be mandated notice, i.e., requiring or incentivizing
firms to disclose their practices to consumers and others.84 Seeking to avoid
political and other costs associated with fashioning and enforcing rules, but
nevertheless eager to act on a given societal problem, regulators have turned
to notice in a widening variety of contexts.85 Having a written policy
regarding how consumer data is being used, for instance, is one of the only
affirmative obligations of websites with respect to privacy.86 Prosecutors can
refer to arrestee statements as long as the arresting officer read the suspect
her Miranda rights.87 And so on.
The mechanism of mandated notice is the required provision of
information.88 The regulator assumes there is a gap in knowledge between
one party (e.g., the lender, the manufacturer) and another (the consumer).
The purpose of notice is to bridge that gap.89 Notice posits a world in which
better decision-making is possible where individuals have all the facts. It
comes in a variety of forms. Regulators can demand—or courts, expect—
that warnings appear on dangerous products. These notices tend to be short,
consumer-facing, and appear at a decision point, such as drug packaging or
the fence before a railway track.90 To address consumer privacy, officials
require firms to post terms describing their practices and rules, often at

83. Julianne Pepitone, New Netflix Facebook App Lets Users Share Viewing History, CNNMONEY
(Mar. 13, 2013, 4:32 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/13/technology/social/netflixfacebook/index.html. The Senate also approved the amendment, which the President signed
into law. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat.
2414 (2013) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710).
84. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007) (“There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that
use disclosure in whole or in part to accomplish their purposes.”); William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707–08
(1999) (“Enthusiasm for mandatory disclosure laws is reaching fever pitch. Virtually every bill
under consideration by Congress to regulate managed care devotes major portions to
information disclosure and dissemination.”).
85. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 658–64 (listing contexts in which notice
is used); id. at 681–84 (explaining why lawmakers choose notice).
86. See Calo, supra note 6, at 1031–33.
87. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (holding that prosecutors could
not use a statement collected from custodial interrogation unless law enforcement
demonstrated certain procedural safeguards were in place at the time of the statement). The
suspect must also waive those rights. Id.
88. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 649–50.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 705–06.
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length.91 Regulators can also demand transparency in the form of very
lengthy reports at a level of detail that may only interest sophisticated parties
such as institutional investors, academics, non-profits, or the press.92 Or they
can require notifications: letters, emails, or other communications alerting an
individual to the existence of an obligation or right.93 But common to each
form of notice is the idea that more information arms the individual or
group with the capability to avoid danger, preserve rights, select the right
provider and activity level, and generally make better decisions.94
There are many reasons regulators choose notice. One set of reasons
has to do with the paucity or inconvenience of regulatory alternatives.95 Take
product warnings. The state could require hair dryers to be waterproof, an
expensive and invasive form of regulating by design. Or manufacturers
could simply have to warn consumers that they may be electrocuted if they
use the device in the bathtub.96 In addition to imposing expenses that firms
are likely to pass along to consumers, regulators may worry that forcing
particular practices may curb innovation or variety. This is largely the
rationale behind the light-touch, disclosure-centric approach that regulators
have historically brought to the Internet.97
Consumer preferences are also deeply heterogeneous. Some consumers
wish for more privacy while others could not care less. Sports car enthusiasts
want higher octane gas and are willing to pay for it; others just want their
vehicle to run. The dream of notice is that consumers will be able to choose
from among competing options, as long as they know about them.98 And
regulators, meanwhile, do not need to undertake the difficult, costly, and
politically challenging task of telling firms exactly how they should run their
businesses.99
The central criticism of notice is that it is ineffective, possibly
endemically so. In a sustained critique, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl
Schneider refer to mandated disclosure as “a regulatory technique that is
much used but little remarked.”100 Notice is certainly much used. But many

91. See Calo, supra note 6, at 1032 (discussing a California law requiring companies to post
an Internet link to privacy policies).
92. See id. at 1063.
93. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 705–06 (providing examples of
notifications).
94. Id. at 649–50.
95. See Calo, supra note 6, at 1048–50.
96. Here, the incentive comes from the courts, which are unlikely to hold a firm
accountable for injuries where there has been good warning. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
97. See Calo, supra note 6, at 1048.
98. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 649, 681.
99. Id. at 681–84.
100. Id. at 649; see also id. at 684 (“Its critics are few.”).
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scholars, in law and other disciplines, have engaged in sustained criticisms of
notice over the years.101
Despite a variety of contexts and disciplines, the gist of their complaint
is that notice seldom works in practice. Consumers and citizens do not
benefit from more information as expected. They do not receive the
information in the first place, cannot process it, or they use it to draw the
wrong lessons.102 Behavioral economics—the genesis for libertarian
paternalism—has perhaps done the most to arm critics of notice with fodder
for calling in doubt its most basic assumptions.103 Sure, a perfect person
would heed all the warnings she came across, but in actuality warnings wear
out when we see too many of them.104 Defects in notice have been described
in theory and demonstrated empirically in lab and natural experiments.105
Ben-Shahar and Schneider deploy these criticisms at length. The article
has a thirteen-paragraph short story about Chris Consumer, “the poster
child of the disclosure paradigm,” who has a reaction to all of the notices in
his life worthy of Joseph K.106 But the authors do a lot more. They also
demonstrate how difficult it is for lawmakers to design disclosures in the first
place, to select what traits or messages should be disclosed or highlighted, to
measure a given notice’s efficacy, or even to know when disclosure is the
appropriate strategy to pursue.107 They point to hidden costs and
unintended consequences of even the best-laid disclosure strategies.108 And
they show the opportunities and incentives for firms purposefully to
manipulate disclosures to hide disadvantageous practices in plain sight or
otherwise serve their own interests.109

101. E.g., SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING DATA
FORUM, ON NOTICE: THE TROUBLE WITH NOTICE AND CONSENT (2009) (criticizing privacy
notice); Cate, supra note 67 (criticizing privacy notice); Dalley, supra note 84 (criticizing
notice); Edwards, supra note 67, at 204 (“Put bluntly, many critics simply do not think that
disclosure works.”); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006) (criticizing boilerplate); Manne, supra
note 67 (criticizing securities disclosures); Ripken, supra note 67 (same); Sage, supra note 84
(criticizing notice); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519 (2008)
(criticizing Miranda warnings); Willis, supra note 67 (criticizing lending disclosures).
102. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 704–29.
103. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
104. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 64, at 212 (describing “wear-out” as the phenomenon
“in which consumers learn to tune out messages that are repeated too often”).
105. E.g., Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 574 (2012) (analyzing restaurant grading systems in several cities).
106. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 705–09. The reference is to the protagonist
of Franz Kafka’s 1925 classic novel, The Trial, who either committed suicide or was killed by
agents of the state, depending on one’s interpretation.
107. Id. at 679–90.
108. Id. at 735–42.
109. Id. at 698–702; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 66, 643–93, 721–49 (discussing
incentives for firms to exploit cognitive bias); Hillman, supra note 101, at 837–40, 849–56
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IV. OVERLAP
The previous three Parts develop a sketch of code, nudge, and notice,
respectively. Largely because they arise out of specific contexts, these three
regulatory strategies are not often treated together.110 Code, nudge, and
notice emerge from different conversations, which makes it look as though
we are talking about different things. This Part examines certain meaningful
overlap between each regulatory method through two lenses. First, taking a
page from Lon Fuller, I show how the category that attaches to a particular
regulatory intervention shifts depending on the regulator’s apparent
purpose.111 Second, and more fundamentally, I explore the common basis
for criticism of each method—code and nudge, in particular. Note that the
claim is not that code, nudge, and notice represent identical approaches to
governing behavior. Clear differences exist. For instance, a nudge should
have no effect on a person lacking any bias, whereas code presumably works
regardless.112 The claim is only that the approaches arose in widely disparate
academic contexts, which obscures a meaningful similarity—the lack of
protective processes that each alternative affords.
A. DIFFERING CONVERSATIONS
The insight that architecture can constitute a form of governmental
control dates at least as far back as the situational crime prevention
movement of the 1980s,113 perhaps even as far back as the work of late 18th
century British philosopher Jeremy Bentham.114 But we owe the
contemporary popularity of code in American legal thought to Lessig’s book
by that title and to earlier articles by Lessig and Joel Reidenberg about

(discussing how boilerplate backfires against consumers). But see Calo, supra note 6, at 1065–68
(discussing strategies to combat notice gamesmanship on the part of firms).
110. A 2011 essay mentions in passing that “libertarian paternalism can be described as the
noncriminal mirror image of situational crime prevention.” Danny Rosenthal, Assessing Digital
Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 576, 583 (2011). Even this
brief analogy is not entirely accurate, however, for reasons I develop in this Part.
111. Lon Fuller famously critiqued H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between easy and hard cases of
legal interpretation through the observation that even supposedly clear rules depend on
purpose for interpretation. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958). Hart put forward “no vehicles in the park” as an easy rule
to interpret; Fuller asked whether the law would apply to a World War II truck placed in the
park as a memorial. Id. at 663.
112. If person A suffers from the cognitive bias of anchoring but person B does not, then
showing a high number before asking for an estimate will lead only A to a higher guess. See
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1128 –30 (1974). But both person A and person B will presumably slow down at
a speed bump. Id. at 1129.
113. See, e.g., SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE, supra note 21.
114. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 6 n.6.
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cyberlaw.115 Lessig in particular was interested in disabusing proponents of
Internet exceptionalism, i.e., early Internet law scholars such as David Post
and David Johnson who argued at the time that the Internet was such a
different space as to constitute an ungovernable sovereign, beyond the reach
of the rule of law.116 Lessig’s now well-known argument is that law is only one
of four “modalities” of regulation.117 Even were it true that law could not
reach Internet conduct to the same extent—itself an open question—other
modalities might. In fact, because the Internet is a mediated or designed
environment, it is especially susceptible to regulation by requiring or
incentivizing changes to the network or software that comprises it.118 Lessig’s
focus was firmly on the possibilities of control and their import for a thenemerging technology.
Nudging has a different context, one that concedes the possibility of—
and consciously rejects—perfect control. Libertarian paternalism operates at
the intersection of anti-paternalism discourse and psychology. Herbert
Simon is largely credited with the observation that human rationality is
limited or “bounded,” a fact for which economic models should account.119
Although the extent and import are in question, there is today widespread
recognition that people depart from rational choice in predictable ways.120
As discussed, this has led to a variety of insights, one of which is that the
government is in a position to exploit cognitive biases to “nudge” people
toward better policy outcomes. Not only can such nudges be effective, the
argument runs, they are freedom-preserving as well, at least relative to
command-and-control. Thus, nudge culls a “third way” between laissez-faire
and paternalism from the behavioral turn in economics.121
Notice shares with nudge a desire to avoid command-and-control
regulation while nevertheless furthering (or appearing to further) public
policy goals.122 And much of the contemporary literature discussing notice
borrows heavily from bounded rationality and all that followed in order to
challenge its efficacy.123 But notice starts at a point prior to nudge in the

115. See LESSIG, supra note 2; Lessig, supra note 1; Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 555 (“This
Article argues, in essence, that the set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and
communication networks form a ‘Lex Informatica’ that policymakers must understand,
consciously recognize, and encourage.”).
116. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370–76 (1996).
117. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 662–63.
118. See generally LESSIG, supra note 2.
119. See SIMON, supra note 55, at 198.
120. See generally ARIELY, supra note 56 (demonstrating the systematic nature of certain
human errors); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4 (discussing how biases lead people to make
wrong decisions).
121. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 252–53.
122. See supra Parts II–III.
123. See supra notes 55–57.
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intellectual life cycle of economics: like traditional economic analysis, notice
assumes that more and better information can correct for poor decisionmaking.124 Notice is a response to information asymmetry that works, if at
all, when it gives people the information they need to act rationally in their
self-interest, thereby protecting themselves and policing the market.125
B. EASY AND HARD CASES
One might think, given the differences in the mechanisms and origins
of code, nudge, and notice, that each would be easy to recognize in the wild.
But the reality is otherwise: whether a given real-world intervention is
properly characterized as code, nudge, or notice often depends on the
reasons behind it. A speed bump represents the consummate example of
regulating by architecture. What of a virtual speed bump? This is a twodimensional drawing that tricks the eye into seeing a three-dimensional
object in the street—for instance, a little girl chasing a ball.126 The
technique’s objective is to slow the driver down to an appropriate speed. But
how? One view says virtual speed bumps work by generating tension or
discomfort, making it harder to drive fast.127 This introduction of resistance
feels like code. Another observes that virtual speed bumps (1) exploit an
error in how we perceive the world, and (2) may technically be overridden
without consequence.128 This looks like textbook nudging. Yet another
suggests that the little girl serves as a salient reminder that children may be
present, which feels more like the creative provision of information and,
hence, notice.129
Sunstein and Thaler suggest a number of means by which to nudge
citizens toward more environment-friendly behavior, one of which is to give
citizens an orb that flashes red when they are using greater than average
amounts of energy.130 They characterize the orb as a form of feedback that,
unlike standard textual notifications, “really gets people’s attention and
makes them want to use less energy.”131 The emphasis here is on changing
behavior. But another way to think about the orb is as a better, more visceral

124. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 649–50.
125. Id.; see also Calo, supra note 6, at 1044.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 11−12.
127. Dillow, supra note 11.
128. See, e.g., Associated Press, Fake Speed Bumps Create Optical Illusion, Driver Confusion,
FOXNEWS.COM (June 27, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/06/27/fake-speedbumps-create-optical-illusion-driver-confusion/ (explaining average driver response to virtual
speed bumps).
129. Cf. Calo, supra note 6, at 1038−41 (describing psychological response as a form of
notice).
130. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 194.
131. Id.
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way to convey notice.132 Under this story, people rationally want to use less
energy to save money, but they are too busy to process information about
their use unless it is sufficiently salient and distilled. Yet another angle notes
that we are preprogrammed to stop for flashing red lights, so the orb acts as
a kind of cultural code.
Or take the example of graphic warnings on cigarettes, an issue that
seemed headed toward the Supreme Court of the United States until the
FDA reversed itself.133 Rather than make a standard textual disclosure
regarding the danger of smoking, graphic warnings depict alarming
scenarios such as a body pinned to an autopsy table or a woman crying
hysterically.134 The mechanism of graphic warnings was precisely at issue. If
the warnings’ purpose was merely to provide truthful information (cigarettes
are bad for you) in a salient format, then the warnings were simply a new
form of notice, and the First Amendment would not have stood in the way of
requiring cigarette manufactures to add them to the package. If, as one
district and circuit court suggested, the purpose was instead to drive down
smoking through revulsion, then the requirement rose above mere
“information” and would have triggered higher constitutional scrutiny as
coerced speech.135 The theory was that forcing a firm to try to change its
customers’ behavior is not best characterized as notice.
Let’s return to the speed bump itself. Surely this is an easy case of code.
And yet not really. A supposed difference between code and law is that one
is perfect in its ability to regulate conduct and the other, imperfect.136 But
this assumption is not warranted: few architectural interventions will stop
everyone, all of the time. Tim Wu and James Grimmelman, among others,

132. Cf. Calo, supra note 6, at 1027. Notice to consumers can also nudge firms toward
better policy outcomes because companies have to take stock of their practices before they can
disclose, sometimes leading them to question or change the propriety of those practices. Id. at
1060 (citing Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1263, 1314−17 (2002)).
133. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
134. The FDA regulations can be found at Cigarette Package and Advertising Warnings, 21
C.F.R. pt. 1141 (2013).
135. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012); R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45–49 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 696 F.3d
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The district court opinion mentions the FDA’s own analysis that cites
favorably to the negative effect of graphic warnings on smoking in Europe. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco,
823 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
136. ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 107, 110 (stating that “[t]he law as we have known it has
had flexible borders . . . . When code is law, however, execution is exquisite, and the law can be
self-enforcing” and referring to “[t]he prospect of more thorough or ‘perfect’ law
enforcement”); Lessig, supra note 46, at 1408 (referring to code as “a start to the perfect
technology of justice”).
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point out that resistance to architecture is not only always possible, it is also
largely to be expected.137
If the difference between code and nudges is more a matter of
probability, then nudges begin to feel more like code as their effectiveness
increases. Nudges are, after all, forces designed to act on the individual, to
constrain her from taking all but the desired path. They can be stronger or
weaker,138 but that nudges are predominantly psychological as opposed to
physical does not seem to do much work in differentiating them from other
modalities.139 Thus, for instance, a defendant can be held liable for the tort
of assault―i.e., creating the imminent apprehension of bodily
harm―merely by yelling “watch out, snake!”140 Indeed, George Loewenstein
and Ted O’Donoghue talk about nudges away from an activity as a “psychic
cost,” a kind of tax that generates no revenue.141 Perhaps speed bumps are
architecture. But perhaps they are also nudges or even highly visceral
reminders of the risks of speeding in a residential neighborhood.
C. COMMON VALUES
Regardless of whether real interventions are easily sorted in practice,
surely there are differences in code, nudge, and notice as theories. Code is
effective but undermines process or privacy. Nudging nominally preserves
autonomy but relies on manipulation and threatens to infantilize. Notice is
politically palatable but seldom very effective. Neither the reasons for which
each method is adopted, nor the criticisms one sees levied against them,
appear to have much in the way of overlap at first blush.
Yet there is abundant commonality. Code, nudge, and notice all serve as
popular alternatives to enacting and enforcing new laws. Several values—

137. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003); James Grimmelmann,
Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1742–44 (2005).
138. Writing in the context of incremental criminalization, Dan Kahan has famously drawn
a distinction between a “gentle nudge” and “hard shove.” Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges Vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). This dichotomy has since
been picked up in the context of libertarian paternalism. See, e.g., Kyle Powys Whyte et al.,
Nudge, Nudge or Shove, Shove—The Right Way for Nudges to Increase the Supply of Donated Cadaver
Organs, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32, 32–35 (2012).
139. Recent work on willpower, for instance, suggests that people have limited reserves that
can be exhausted over the course of the day. See ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY,
WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING THE GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH (2011).
140. Assuming, of course, there was no snake. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 25
cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965).
141. See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard
Way”: Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 190 (2006). The
New Chicago School, or at least a visible proponent, sees ordinary taxes on an activity as fitting
within the “market” modality of regulation. See Lessig, supra note 1, at 663, 666. It does not take
much in the way of reframing to see that taxes are essentially fees on undesirable behavior, i.e.,
laws without norms. It may be equally difficult to sort real regulations into the four modalities
of laws, norms, markets, and architecture, but such is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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efficacy, transparency, process, and autonomy—arise as either a feature or a
bug of these alternatives, depending on one’s perspective. From the
perspective of the regulator, code can be highly effective at changing
behavior. Code can be hard to observe, much less challenge, such that
regulation by architecture does not necessarily require expending as much
political capital to enact or defend.142 From the perspective of the critic, the
very problem with code is that it lacks transparency, cannot be challenged,
and may be too effective.143
Nudging is more effective than not regulating at all and leaves citizens
with an option to resist. Yet nudging also suffers from a lack of transparency.
Some of libertarian paternalism’s most celebrated techniques may not work
very well were they known to those on the receiving end.144 Nudging, like
code, can be accomplished without the intervention of the executive or the
legislative branches of the government. Both nudging and code raise the
possibility that firms will try to influence consumer behavior by way of
influencing regulators rather than consumers—a potentially more efficient
means of manipulation.145 Nudging also undermines autonomy, albeit in a
different way than code. Whereas code literally cuts off, or at least drastically
reduces, possibilities for resistance, nudges may reduce in citizens even the
habit or instinct of thinking and choosing for themselves.146
Notice does not have these exact problems. Notice’s very mechanism is
transparency; its chief drawback is that it is not effective enough.147 But even
notice shares with code and nudge at least one criticism: regulators use
notice to avoid having to actually regulate, in part because of the resistance
officials believe they will encounter from the potential subjects of substantive
limits on conduct (and their lawyers). I am generally a proponent of notice
142. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 43–62.
143. See supra notes 36–52 and accompanying text.
144. People often correct against bias when they become aware of it. For instance, subjects
are unlikely to commit an error by following the general consensus in the room when they are
aware the other subjects are only actors. See ORI BRAFMAN & ROM BRAFMAN, SWAY: THE
IRRESISTIBLE PULL OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 153–54 (2008). In this way, nudges resemble the
use of placebos in medicine.
145. Compare Glaeser, supra note 8, at 145 (discussing how firms can use knowledge of bias
to influence officials), with Wu, supra note 137, at 693–95 (discussing how code can constitute a
covert form of lobbying).
146. Secondary architecture, as discussed, relies on surveillance, which Julie Cohen, Paul
Schwartz, Daniel Solove, and others suggest reduces autonomy and polices against thinking and
behavior outside of the mainstream. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/and
Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and
the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609 (1999).
147. Of course, notice can be paralyzing, as Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s example of Chris
Consumer is meant in part to showcase. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 705–09; see
supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
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and believe it can work if updated to reflect contemporary techniques of
communication.148 But I would concede to Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and
others that notice sometimes represents an abdication of official
responsibility.149
What, if anything, does this values-overlap tell us? First, it indicates that
sidestepping political and judicial process is a common goal of each of these
popular alternatives to law—it animates the very decision to select an
alternative in the first place. The avoidance of ex ante and ex post process is
also the gravamen of the critiques of at least code and nudge, and notice to
a lesser degree. Second, the values-overlap tends to reveal the difficulty
officials encounter as they seek to substitute another means of behavior
control for the coercive mechanism of law. One feature of law is that it can
represent a strong incentive to behave without obscuring or eliminating the
existence of a choice.150
The law’s signaling function presents one example. The fact that our
elected officials adopt and enforce laws reinforces their weight as social
norms that should be followed.151 But even the proverbial “bad man” knows
transgression means fees, deprivation of liberty, or even death.152 The law
can be resisted and changed, and thrives on resistance at various stages, yet
resistance may not be an option with regard to alternatives to law.153 This
second tension is the subject of the final Part of this Essay.
V. FRICTION OR FACILITATION?
The preceding Parts describe the attractions, pitfalls, and arguably
permeable boundaries of three ascendant regulatory strategies. Here the
Essay takes a normative turn. This Part offers and defends a lodestar for
regulators experimenting with alternatives to law: they should try to
maximize what I am calling facilitation and minimize friction. Facilitation
refers to helping people arrive at their preferred outcome,154 whereas
friction operates by erecting barriers qua barriers, whether physical or

148. See generally Calo, supra note 6 (cautioning against an excessive skepticism of notice).
149. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5, at 681 (describing mandatory disclosure as
a “Lorelei, luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure”).
150. The degree of incentive depends on a variety of factors—including the likelihood of
enforcement, the penalty, and knowledge of each of these things. See generally Samuel L. Bray,
Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753 (2012) (discussing the benefits of announcing
remedies for breaking laws versus the effects of not announcing remedies).
151. See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment,
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2009).
152. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
153. See supra notes 43–48; see also PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 52 (discussing the role of
law in property); ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 101–26 (discussing the role of law in computing).
154. See infra notes 166–77 and accompanying text.
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psychological, to undesired behavior.155 Neither is the same as a traditional
legal rule, which establishes an official expectation and penalizes
transgression after the fact.156 But each substitutes a different mechanism for
law. Whereas friction seeks to replace deterrence with mechanisms that head
off transgression, facilitation tends to enhance law’s capacity to assist,
coordinate, and inform.157
“Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death,” as Robert
Cover famously reminds us.158 The classic model of law relies primarily on
coercion, i.e., mandating a particular behavior on pain of some negative
consequence, ranging from fees to death. Code, nudge, and notice all seek
to displace or supplement laws of this type, either because regulators
perceive laws to be too ineffective, because passing and enforcing laws is
somehow difficult, or because of some intrinsic objection to command-andcontrol. But to believe that these popular alternatives avoid coercion entirely
would be a mistake. For one thing, where a government mandates that a
third party change its physical or “choice” architecture, or disclose certain
practices, it generally does so using laws and will sanction failure to comply
in the usual way.159 Secondary architectural interventions also increase the
likelihood of coercion in the event of a transgression, again, by modifying
the environment to make detection more likely.
It is relatively easy to see how primary architectural intervention
coerces: it seeks literally to cut off the possibility of transgression. Although
we sense a $3000 fine for jaywalking to be coercive and unreasonable, it
would still be possible to jaywalk were this the penalty. A pedestrian barrier
that rises whenever the light is red is more coercive insofar as it takes this
possibility away. Nudging, too, is coercive—albeit to a lesser degree—
because it introduces various obstacles to conduct.160 To respond that these
obstacles are “all in your head” is not enough because, after all, the obstacle
to jaywalking is in your head: you do not jaywalk because you are worried
that you will be caught and fined. If you are extremely rich, or happen to be
judgment proof, perhaps this worry is minimal. Nor is it necessarily true that
resisting a nudge is without costs. There is the discomfort, the time, the
155. Forcing a decision point is a barrier of a kind, but, I will argue, a more legitimate one
than simply making an action harder to reduce its incidence.
156. See HART, supra note 1, at 3.
157. This is not to say that coercion is the only way law changes behavior. Law has a
signaling function, for instance. See supra text accompanying note 151. One recalls H.L.A.
Hart’s criticism of the “bad man” theory of law: “Why should not law be equally if not more
concerned with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to do what is required, if
only he can be told what it is?” HART, supra note 1, at 40.
158. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
159. See, e.g., Marcia Hofmann, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy, in PROSKAUER
ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 4:3.3, at
4-16 to 4-47 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2013) (reviewing FTC enforcement of online privacy).
160. See supra Part IV.C.
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depletion of will power, and so forth, associated with overcoming the
“architecture” of the choice.161 Even notice can enact a form of penalty, as
when ignoring the many notices Chris Consumer encounters can later
compromise his rights in court in the event of a conflict.162
Perhaps a better way to talk about alternatives to law is that some eschew
coercion only to reintroduce its close cousin, friction. Friction can be
stronger or weaker than legal coercion, which itself varies in force
depending on various factors.163 But the underlying mechanism of friction is
to make behavior the government does not like costlier in some sense. The
problem with this substitution is that it introduces costs on the citizen but
without affording the same processes that attend law.164 Laws need to be
introduced and voted upon. Even after being enacted, laws can be
challenged in the courts of law and public opinion. This is not necessarily
the case for the acts of installing a high pitch noisemaker to deter loitering
or placing healthier food at eye level.165
Alternatives to law such as code and nudges can leverage another form
of coercion—what I am calling friction—to substitute for law’s deterrence
function without the attendant safeguards, but they need not necessarily do
so. Many interventions that are sometimes characterized as code or
nudges—or, at any rate, are capable of such characterization—work
precisely by helping citizens arrive at their own goals. I mention above the
difference between nudging and debiasing.166 Debiasing also encourages
officials to study our cognitive biases, but for a different reason: to combat
them. (Sometimes Sunstein and Thaler continue to talk this way in Nudge, as
when they encourage better “mapping,”167 but mostly the authors embrace
using cognitive biases to direct behavior.) Moreover, environments can be
altered not just to stop conduct, but also to facilitate better decision-making.
Proponents of “think” as an alternative to nudge routinely refer to
technology’s capacity to enhance deliberative democracy.168 Zittrain points
161. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 101.
163. Legal coercion varies both in its severity (from a small fine to the death penalty) and
in the process necessary to bring it to bear (from preponderance of the evidence to beyond a
reasonable doubt).
164. Robert Cover, for all his cynicism, does not deny the existence of process. See Cover,
supra note 158.
165. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 1–2; see Lyall, supra note 41.
166. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
167. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 91–94. One reviewer holds that Nudge is really
two books: one about correcting the bias, the other about pressing bias into a kind of
paternalism. See Schlag, supra note 80, at 914. My own reading tends strongly toward the latter:
the use of bias to “nudge” is what is distinct about the book.
168. “Think” refers not to facilitation, as I’ve defined it, but rather to a set of techniques
aimed at fostering the best conditions for arriving at collective societal preference. See PETER
JOHN ET AL., NUDGE, NUDGE, THINK, THINK: EXPERIMENTING WITH WAYS TO CHANGE CIVIC
BEHAVIOUR 13–14 (2011).
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to “code-backed norms,” meaning the use of architecture to bolster social
constraints, as a way to help solve recurrent problems of online civility and
privacy.169
Indeed, combining certain elements of a given strategy yields new
possibilities for facilitation. The entire premise of notice is that giving
people more information will help them make better choices.170 The reason
notice does not always facilitate decision-making is that it does not often
work.171 Both code and nudge hold lessons for how to improve notice,
perhaps to the point that it can begin to deliver on its promise. Notices tend
to be more effective, for instance, when delivered at the point of decision,
which changes in architecture can help ensure.172 A better understanding of
human cognition can help create more experiential forms of notice that
could, at least in theory, outperform the traditional model of words or
pictures.173 We may not pay heed to warnings, but we know when we have a
gas leak because the utilities have added a certain smell.
Or take the example of so-called “fair notice.”174 It is sometimes said
that the only thing laypeople know about law is that ignorance of it is no
defense. And yet due process requires precisely that criminal and civil
defendants have at least the opportunity to understand in advance both
what conduct is wrongful and what penalties might attach.175 Regulators
looking to increase friction might introduce or encourage the use of digital
rights management (code) to make copyright violations harder to commit,
with the downside of encroaching on fair use.176 Regulators who have
facilitation in mind might focus on the use of code to inform citizens of the
illegality of file-sharing and the penalties that can attach. There may be
other contexts—tax, for instance—where citizens simply do not appreciate

Another potential analog is the distinction between shaming the perpetrator as a form of
punishment and “guilting” as a way to educate the perpetrator as to the scope of his or her
wrong. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?: Retributivism and the
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2179 (2001) (“I distinguish
shame and guilt in the following, and admittedly, crude manner: shame is the emotion one
feels when subjected to public degradation, whereas guilt is the emotion one feels after
consciously becoming aware of wrongdoing over which one feels responsible.”). I owe this
second distinction to Steve Calandrillo.
169. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 23, at 223–28.
170. See supra Part III.
171. See supra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
172. See Willis, supra note 67, at 749–50.
173. See generally Calo, supra note 6.
174. See Jeffrey A. Love, Comment, Fair Notice About Fair Notice, 121 YALE L.J. 2395, 2395
(2012) (discussing the rule of lenity).
175. Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive
fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity
of the penalty that a State may impose.”).
176. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 136.
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the illegality or extent of illegality of their actions and would not choose to
commit those actions if they had that knowledge.177
I do not mean to suggest there is no room for friction. It may always be
necessary to make the penalty for corporate malfeasance, for instance,
higher than the profit. What I am defending is a self-conscious preference
for facilitation where possible, on the theory that we should abandon the
safeguards that attend law only where it can be said that we are helping
citizens do what they would do if they had the right information and tools.
The role of the state as facilitator need not meet the same burden of
justification. There is also a sense in which one person’s facilitation is
another’s friction. Samuel Bray, for one, distinguishes between “harm
rules”—the purpose of which is to penalize a powerful person if she harms
someone vulnerable—and “power rules”—the purpose of which is to change
a perceived power imbalance.178 Thus, to prevent hold-ups, a city could
enhance penalties for robbery (harm rule), but it could also require store
clerks to install bulletproof glass (power rule), which introduces friction into
the lives of robbers. Similarly, if officials were to offer store clerks useful
information designed to facilitate self-protection—crime statistics, for
instance, or tips on spotting when someone is “casing” their store—the
resulting steps taken by the clerks would constitute a form of friction as seen
from the perspective of the criminal.
I also do not mean to suggest that facilitation represents an easy road.
First, there is the danger that facilitation will blend into friction. Conveying
anything neutrally is a difficult task; how the speaker frames information can
affect how the content is received, potentially pushing the audience toward a
particular substantive conclusion (i.e., creating friction). Thus, for instance,
study subjects were more likely to suggest increased penalties and
enforcement where crime was cast rhetorically as a “wild beast preying on a
city,” and more likely to suggest social reforms where crime was described as
a “virus infecting a city.”179 It will also be difficult to understand when and
how to facilitate decision-making, just as it is difficult to know when and how
to mandate disclosure, and especially when to give up on facilitation as
unworkable in a given context. But these are known dangers that attend all
official communication, and the regulator bent on friction has no less need
to determine the right conduct to slow down or act to prevent.
Of particular concern is the serious doubt among many who study
decision-making that there is even such a thing as “preference” that does not

177. Thus, for instance, the tax code could modulate salience by penalty. For more on the
burgeoning tax salience literature, see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax
Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011). Thank you to Shannon
McCormack for making this connection.
178. Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1173 (2010).
179. Paul H. Thibodeau & Lera Boroditsky, Metaphors We Think With: The Role of Metaphor in
Reasoning, 6 PLoS ONE, Feb. 23, 2011, at 2.
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depend almost entirely on framing or context.180 In other words, people may
not have preexisting preferences that the law can help surface in the first
place. The arguable impossibility of avoiding influence entirely in the
provision of information is partly why this Essay suggests a lodestar—
maximizing facilitation and minimizing friction—instead of a hard-and-fast
rule. Perhaps the most that can be said, for now, is that the sources for
preferences are many, and they may likely include law or policy.181 Thus,
regulators should be mindful of the line between providing citizens with
more or better information and shaping their views.182
Ultimately, the lodestar of facilitation is just that. Rather than label a
given regulatory intervention reflexively as code, nudge, or notice, and then
defend or criticize it on the basis of this characterization, officials and
academics should be looking to the extent the intervention hinders or helps.
Given the initial choice, regulators should try to maximize facilitation
because doing so tends to mitigate the concerns that normally attend
substituting for law and its safeguards.
CONCLUSION
The last decade has seen a dramatic turn toward non-legal methods of
controlling citizen behavior. The regulatory techniques colloquially known
as code, nudge, and notice have proven particularly attractive to regulators
seeking to alter conduct without passing or enforcing new rules. Each
technique has been described, defended, and criticized in isolation. This
Essay is the first to treat them together, surfacing at least two novel insights.
The first is the descriptive point that the techniques are not as distinct as
they appear. Their boundaries are permeable, which perhaps explains the
difficulty that arises when we try to sort real-world interventions into the
categories of code, nudge, and notice. And although they grow out of
distinct conversations, the criticisms of these alternatives share considerable
overlap—namely, that they substitute for law without replicating its
safeguards.
The second insight is normative. We might ask not only whether to
code, nudge, or notice, but also whether code, nudge, or notice are the
right categories for study. At a minimum, theses labels tend to obscure the
deeper divide between what I have labeled facilitation and friction. Each

180. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 20; Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane: ContextDependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858 (2011).
181. Cf. Citron, supra note 151 (arguing that law has a “signaling” function that can affect
citizen norms and beliefs).
182. The government will be in a position to facilitate selectively, i.e., only invest resources
in facilitation where they believe citizens will come to the “right” conclusion. As long as the
government does not facilitate only certain outcomes, I do not see this as a problem. Note that we
are comparing selective facilitation to the other choices: rendering undesired conduct unlawful
or otherwise introducing friction.
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regulatory intervention described in this Essay is capable of both facilitation
and friction, alone or in combination. They represent in this way a
tremendous opportunity. In particular, a better understanding of the power
of physical and “choice” architecture (coding and nudging) could enhance
the historically ineffective provision of information (giving notice).
Regulators should arguably exhaust the possibilities for helping citizens that
inhere in code, nudge, or notice before introducing a form of coercion that
lacks the usual process that attends law.

